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This contribution attempts to provide a broad perspective to the psychological study
of neuroenhancement (NE). It departs from the assumption that, as the use of
performance enhancing substances in sport, the use of substances with the aim of
improving one’s cognitive, motivational and affective functioning in academic domains
is a goal-directed behavior. As such, its scientific study may very well benefit from
an analysis taking into account the psychological processes regulating people’s
behavioral intentions and decisions. Within this broad framework, this contribution
addresses several issues that currently seem to characterize the debate in the
literature on neuroenhancement substances (NES) use. The first conceptual issue
seeks to determine and define the “boundaries” of the phenomenon. The second
issue concerns the empirical evidence on the prevalence of using certain substances
for the purpose of NE. Finally, there is a debate around the ethical and moral
implications of NE. Along these lines, the existing psychological research on NE
has adopted mainly sociological and economic decision-making perspectives, greatly
contributing to the psychological discourse about the phenomenon of NE. However, we
argue that the existing psychological literature does not offer a common, explicit and
integrated theoretical framework. Borrowing from the framework of doping research, we
recommend the adoption of a social cognitive model for pursuing a systematic analysis
of the psychological processes that dynamically regulate students’ use of NES over
time.
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PREMISES
The use of pharmacological substances to enhance performance is an issue psychologists have
thoroughly investigated in the sport context. In this context, a broad psychological perspective
focusing on the social-cognitive processes regulating one’s intentions and use of performance
enhancement substances has been largely adopted by many scholars in recent years (see Ntoumanis
et al., 2014, for a review). Similarly, the use of substances with the aim of improving one’s cognitive,
motivational and affective functioning in academic and work contexts has also recently emerged and
been debated as a critical research issue in the literature on neuroenhancement (NE) and cognitive
enhancement (e.g., Zohny, 2015).
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We believe this debate is currently focusing on three clearly
distinct—and yet intimately related—issues. There is a conceptual
focus which seeks to determine and define the “boundaries”
of the phenomenon. Some boundaries stress the distinction
between pharmacological and non-pharmacological substances
to enhance performance. Other boundaries instead refer to the
distinction between “hot” (e.g., mood, motivation) and “cold”
(e.g., attention, memory) cognitions, and to the general notion
that cognitive enhancement seemingly only matters for the latter
type of cognitions (Zohny, 2015). Finally, there are boundaries
stressing the contexts in which it is plausible or relevant to
discuss NE (e.g., work places, educational settings) and those to
which the term of NE instead does not apply (e.g., recreational
settings, sport settings). There also is an empirical debate seeking
to clarify the prevalence and social relevance of using certain
substances for the purpose of NE (e.g., Maier and Schaub, 2015).
There is also a debate around the ethical and moral implications
of NE, with the literature primarily addressing issues ranging
from personal safety, to the social responsibility of institutions,
agencies or firms promoting or contributing to NE, to issues
about a person’s character and his or her right to seek a good life
(Schermer, 2008). This contribution briefly summarizes the key
elements of these debates and, while recognizing the undisputable
value these debates have for scientific progress, also argues that
they are undermined by a lack of explicit reference to a clear
theoretically-grounded psychological perspective.We believe that
the adoption of a theoretical psychological perspective, as in
the case of existing doping research, would favor a shift from
insightful and yet seemingly endless debates to prospective
research and intervention programs that could clarify and
possibly resolve some of these debates. In the remaining sections
of this paper, we attempt to sustain and justify this core
belief.
Finally, it is important to note that the present contribution
unfolds with an exclusive focus on academic or educational
contexts. Typically, these contexts offer clear-cut and broadly
acknowledged behavioral criteria and protocols for referring to
and observing individuals’ performances. Furthermore, as also
suggested by Kipke (2013), academic examinations and testing
might warrant special attention, as performance outcomes clearly
rely on one’s cognitive functioning and capacities. Third, NE
in these settings also raises issues regarding the integrity and
validity of academic examinations and testing results. As a
concluding note, academic and educational settings are also
the contexts which have often been the target of empirical
studies on NE (e.g., Smith and Farah, 2011; Franke et al.,
2014).
DEFINITIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
CONCERNING NEUROENHANCEMENT
Should NE be considered a complex property of some substances
currently is a matter of debate, and the scientific evidence
and general understanding of this proposition seems far
from having been ascertained or confirmed (Zohny, 2015).
Even if one departed from the definition of NE that in
recent years has been shared by scholars and referred to as
“.: : : the misuse of prescription drugs, other illicit drugs, or alcohol
for the purpose of enhancing cognition, mood, or prosocial
behavior in academic or work related contexts” (e.g., Maier
and Schaub, 2015, p. 156), we feel that this definition, despite
being extremely clear, still needs further consideration or
clarification.
First, some NE studies distinguish among prescribed-
substances (e.g., Methylphenidate, Modafinil, Amphetamines,
etc), substances of abuse (e.g., Alcohol, Cannabis, Cocaine) and
over-the-counter substances or drugs (e.g., caffeinated products
and food supplements), the so called “soft enhancers” or “life
style” drugs (e.g., Franke et al., 2014; Maier and Schaub, 2015).
Second, clarification seems warranted when one considers the
extent to which NE must or needs to be conceived with respect
to behavioral rather than cognitive performance criteria (e.g.,
a substance enhances one’s memory which, in turn, affects
and positively contributes to one’s exam grades). With this in
mind, some scholars (e.g., Zohny, 2015) distinguish substances’
effects on mood or motivational processes from their effects
on other processes, such as attention or memory, and go on in
suggesting that the latter type of effects specifically constitutes
cognitive enhancement. Whether “cognitive” only refers to what
is traditionally seen as “cold” cognition or, rather, whether
motivational and emotional processes legitimately represent
parts of one’s cognitions, is an issue that has been long debated in
classical work (e.g., Pessoa, 2008).
In the context of the present contribution, it seems important to
us to highlight another issue that perhaps has relevant assonances
with the distinction between “cold” and “hot” cognitions. One’s
use of cognitive enhancement substances legitimately may call
upon two broadly alternative cases. The first envisions the
possibility that one may use a given substance to improve his
or her “effort” as a means of performance (e.g., Ritalin to
stay awake and study for a longer time). The second envisions
the possibility that one may use a given substance to improve
specific cognitive functions or tasks (e.g., memory recall or
problem solving). Both cases highlight a critical issue in any
psychological analysis, that of one’s goals for choosing a particular
course of action. At any rate, to what extent any or both
of these cases must be considered “cognitive enhancement”
has not yet been addressed by the existing literature. At a
minimum, however, it seems plausible to hypothesize that
users of cognitive enhancement substances might primarily
be interested in achieving their best (academic) performance
outcomes, rather than in the processes underlying any particular
outcome.
We think the above issues, despite their peculiarities, offer some
ground for consensus. The use of neuroenhancement substances
(NES), by students or professionals, reflects a person’s conscious
or deliberate intentions, at least in the case of unsupervised use
of psychoactive substances by healthy individuals. Furthermore,
no matter what the NES chemical and medical properties are
with respect to the enhancement of specific cognitive capacities
(e.g., memory), we think that there is consensus in the literature
on the general view that individuals pursue enhancement
goals with the intention of influencing actual behavioral
performance.
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THE PREVALENCE OF
NEUROENHANCEMENT SUBSTANCE USE
A large number of recent empirical NE studies have estimated
the prevalence of NES use. However, it seems difficult to
draw a precise and reliable map of its diffusion, as prevalence
estimates often vary widely depending upon sampling criteria,
measurements, and demographic or contextual factors. For
instance, Smith and Farah (2011), in reviewing 28 epidemiological
studies on the prevalence of non-medical prescription drug use
in American and Canadian students, reported a lifetime use of
stimulants for non-medical purposes ranging from 5.3 to 55%.
More recently, Franke et al. (2014) have reviewed studies reporting
prevalence rates for NES use that range from 1 to 20%.
The issue of reliably assessing prevalence rates has also
characterized doping research, and the distinction between legal
and illegal substances has definitely contributed to establishing
valid estimates of doping use in sport settings (Mallia et al., 2013).
In a similar fashion, it is plausible that the distinction among non-
medical prescription drugs, drugs of abuse, and soft-enhancers
(e.g., caffeine) in the NE literature might contribute to a correct
assessment of prevalence estimates.
Generally speaking, however, the estimation of prevalence of
NES use, as for performance enhancing substances (PES) use in
sport, remains a complex process andmanymethodological issues
could influence it and lead to increasing variability and differences
in findings across studies. For instance, while social desirability
biases might easily come into play in the assessment of doping
substance use in the face of explicit sport law regulations against
their adoption, the lack of any clear-cut social or legal norms about
NES may pose complex challenges for correct or agreed-upon
prevalence rates.
ETHICAL AND MORAL ISSUES
CONCERNING NEUROENHANCEMENT
There is an important debate concerning the ethical issue related
to the use of NES. Some scholars argue that, especially in
the context of examinations, this behavior might be considered
cheating, because its usemay alter performance (Schermer, 2008),
as in the well-known case of doping in sports. There are a number
of parallels between the misuse of NES in academic settings and
doping in sport. In both contexts, an individual is misusing a
substance that has legitimate medical value with the purpose
of increasing one’s own performance. As in the field of doping
research (see, for istance, Petroczi, 2013), several scholars have
debated the ethical and moral implications of using NES in
academic or educational settings (e.g., Kipke, 2013; Zohny, 2015).
At the same time, there are also some clear differences between
the use of NES and the use of doping substances. In sport
contexts, there is a clear and well-accepted distinction between
which substances and protocols are illicit (illegal performance
enhancing substances) and which are not (legal performance
enhancing substances). In educational and academic contexts,
at least until recently, law or binding regulations concerning
the use of cognitive enhancing substances were lacking. Some
universities, in fact, have recently clarified in their own academic
conduct policies that the use of prescription medications aimed
at enhancing academic performance falls in the category of
“academic dishonesty” (e.g., Duke University: Policy on academic
dishonesty; URL: https://studentaffairs.duke.edu/conduct/z-
policies/academic-dishonesty), even though policies of this sort
are still a matter of debate (e.g., Schermer, 2008; Dubljević, 2013).
Interestingly, Dodge et al. (2012) have separately assessed how
individuals judge others who use performance enhancing drugs
both in athletic and academic domains. Not surprisingly, their
findings suggest that people tend to consider the use of NES to
enhance academic performance as more acceptable than doping
substance use in sport.
One could reasonably argue that the lack of clear-cut norms
and regulations for the use of NES makes the latter unfit for
being treated as a case of cheating. Nonetheless, there are some
actions or behaviors that, despite not being clear violations of
explicit rules or norms, allow one to gain some advantages over
others and, as such, might be considered unfair. In the sport
context, these behaviors fall under the rubric of “gamesmanship”
(e.g., Lee et al., 2007). According to Vallerand et al. (1996), in
order to approach the ethical evaluations of a given behavior, one
needs to recognize the social origins of these evaluations, that
is, the notion that they emerge over time by consensus within a
social context. How individuals perceive the misuse of substances
has important implications for prevention efforts. Thus, the use
of NES might be evaluated positively when the emphasis and
judgment criteria focus on one’s effort to perform well, and
negatively when the emphasis and judgment criteria focus on one’s
attempt to increase one’s own academic performance through
the help of pharmacological aids, thus altering the integrity and
validity of (his or her) academic examinations and testing results.
Faulmuller et al. (2013) emphasize that the indirect
psychological costs of the use of NES is related to the ways
people attribute performance to agents. Given that people tend
to exaggerate the efficacy of cognitive enhancers, they might
perceive NES users’ performance as not fully attributable to them.
At any rate, individuals contemplating the use of NES may very
well dwell upon the moral implications of using these substances
and utilize their personal self-sanctions as internal deterrents.
These possibilities imply and presuppose a strong link between
NES use and moral reasoning, and this link is consistent with a
well-grounded psychological literature addressing the relations
between moral reasoning and the use of performance enhancing
substances in sport-related contexts (e.g., Lucidi et al., 2008, 2013;
Zelli et al., 2010).
A SOCIAL COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE
ON NEUROENHANCEMENT
The Theoretical Framework: Its General
Principles and Hypotheses
From the previous sections of this contribution, it appears clear
to us that the use of NES falls under the rubric of a goal-directed
behavior and, as such, its scientific study may very well benefit
from a psychological analysis presuming that NES use depends
on self-regulation and on the mental processes intervening in
behavioral intentions and decisions bounded to specific social
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contexts or situations. So stated, our view endorses key tenets of
a social cognitive perspective on NES use, insofar the latter “: : :.
entails not only behavioral skill in self-managing environmental
contingencies, but also the knowledge and the sense of personal
agency to enact this skill in relevant contexts. Self-regulation refers
to self-generated thoughts, feelings, and actions that are planned
and cyclically adapted to the attainment of personal goals: : :.”
(Zimmerman, 2000, pp. 13–14).
These general notions seem to be shared at least in part
by psychological research that has adopted sociological and
economic decision-making perspectives (see Sattler et al., 2014,
for a thorough review). Much of this research (e.g., Müller
and Schumann, 2011; Sattler and Wiegel, 2013; Wolff and
Brand, 2013) broadly argues that the use of (or willingness to
use) cognitive enhancement substances reflects an instrumental
decision individuals make on the basis of the degree to
which substance use “fits” their personal preferences, perceived
opportunities and constraints. Consistent with this general
hypothesis, empirical studies have focused on several classes of
variables, ranging fromconsiderations about the risks and benefits
of particular cognitive enhancement drugs’ characteristics (e.g.,
Castaldi et al., 2012), to forms of social environmental effects (e.g.,
forms of social control, social pressure from significant others)
influencing decisions about the use of enhancement substances
(e.g., Glannon, 2008; Bavarian et al., 2013) to, finally, personal
characteristics (e.g., cognitive test anxiety, lack of academic
competencies) that may make individuals more vulnerable at
the time of deciding whether to use cognitive enhancement
substances (e.g., Tice and Baumeister, 1997; Klassen et al., 2008;
Weyandt et al., 2009).
The focus on instrumental decisions also seems to characterize
other NE research stressing the need for psychological theorizing
(e.g., Wolff and Brand, 2013; Wolff et al., 2014). This research
hypothesizes that NE is “: : :the medically unsupervised use of
presumably psychoactive substances by healthy individuals who
expect this substance to be a functional means of enhancing
their cognitive capacity: : :” (Wolff et al., 2014, p. 2). This
research very recently has moved on and utilized principles and
constructs borrowed from occupational theories (e.g., demands,
strain, burnout) to address the “means-to-end” NE hypothesis in
educational settings (Wolff et al., 2014). This research has shown
that the use of lifestyle drugs and prescribed NE drugs is more
likely among university students who experience burnout, and
that the use of NES worsens students’ psychological experience
of academic demands and interferes with their motivational
resources. These existing contributions have greatly contributed
to the psychological discourse about NE.
This notwithstanding, it seems difficult to identify in this
literature a common and explicit theoretical framework. On
the contrary, and interestingly, doping-related psychological
research has in recent years been able to adopt a broad social
cognitive view that clearly and systematically put the study of
performance enhancement substances on a qualitatively different
level of theoretical analysis. According to this social cognitive
view, doping substance use is a goal-directed behavior that
is the expression of one’s intentional processes, and these
intentions reflect the influence of socially construed belief
systems. Illustratively, this broad view has found clear and distinct
expressions in research that variously adopted either a “theory
of planned behavior” approach (e.g., Lucidi et al., 2004; Lazuras
et al., 2010; Mallia et al., 2013), a motivational orientation
approach (e.g., Barkoukis et al., 2013) or an explicit social-
cognitive integrative approach (e.g., Lucidi et al., 2008, 2013; Zelli
et al., 2010; Lazuras et al., 2015). All these cases typically refer to
belief structures, and these beliefs may specifically refer to either
outcome beliefs guiding one’s behavioral attitudes about doping
use, behavioral control beliefs concerning the means for reaching
one’s own goals, personal and self-regulatory efficacy beliefs, or
moral disengagement beliefs that one may adopt to counteract
personal self-sanctions against doping use (e.g., Lucidi et al., 2008,
2013; Lazuras, 2015).
This belief-based social cognitive doping research has
more recently been integrated by an additional social
cognitive component, namely, one’s self-relevance appraisals of
interpersonal and social situations eliciting doping use (Zelli
et al., 2010, 2015). Theoretically, over time, this component
would interact with belief systems in increasing the probability
that people would show doping intentions and actual doping use.
We argue that the theoretical and empirical advances of doping
research stand as a mature and plausible model for moving
forward on NE research. In the following section, we describe,
albeit in broad terms, some key elements of a possible social
cognitive research program for the study of NE use.
A Social Cognitive Research Program
for Neuroenhancement
As an initial note, we believe that a social-cognitive model of NES
use might nicely integrate some of the theoretical propositions
that seem to have variously characterized recent NES studies. One
proposition calls upon an incremental-functional viewofNESuse,
and the hypothesis that students might be motivated and involved
in performance enhancing practices that, over time, increasingly
acquire high instrumental value (e.g., Sattler and Wiegel, 2013;
Wolff and Brand, 2013). Another proposition calls upon belief
systems which may build upon a link between one’s performance
enhancement goals and the functional or moral implications of
NES use as a purposive, goal-driven behavior.
We also believe that, at least in educational settings, research
attention to constructs such as (a) students’ attitudes about NES,
(b) prospective intentions toward NES use, (c) efficacy and self-
regulatory beliefs about one’s own capacity to counteract social
and internal pressures to use NES, (d) personal standards and
justifications in favor or against NES use, and (e) students’
appraisals of the self-relevance of interpersonal situations eliciting
NES use would have high scientific value. It would acknowledge
and be consistent with the above theoretical propositions, as
these social cognitive constructs recognize and encompass the
dynamic and functional properties of one’s life and behavioral
experiences with NES that existing literature has highlighted.
More importantly, it would provide a single, unified, framework
for theory development and assessment, allowing scholars to
pursue a systematic analysis of the psychological processes that
dynamically regulate students’ use of NES over time.
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In our view, such a novel research focus should rely on and
pursue some key research objectives. The first is concerned
with the possibility of clearly establishing the empirical relations
between people’s behavioral intentions and actual NES use. This
first objective necessarily calls upon a second objective, namely,
the adoption of longitudinal research designs allowing scholars
to establish how behavioral intentions contribute to changes in
NES use over time (i.e., controlling for behavioral stability). The
third objective is concerned with the possibility of identifying
the set of key social-cognitive variables regulating people’s NES
behavioral intentions. As these variables operate in a system of
dynamic relations, the empirical focus cannotmerely address their
unique contribution to behavioral NES intentions. Rather, it also
needs to address how changes in themodel of effects on behavioral
intentions correspond to changes in the interrelations among
key social cognitive variables and in their unique contributions.
Consistent with a social-cognitive view of NES, the hypothesis
of a system of interrelated variables influencing one’s behavioral
intentions also calls upon the empirical possibility that this
system is dynamically linked to the meaning people assign to
relevant social and interpersonal situations possibly soliciting
NES use. We believe this is a fourth critical objective for
NES research, insofar as one’s intention to use NES might
be strengthened or, alternatively, weakened by the degree
to which social and interpersonal situations acquire personal
relevance.
As a concluding note, we firmly believe that the social cognitive
research perspective that has been briefly outlined above can
provide, whatever its findings might be, the specific contours
for any educational program that is interested in effectively
addressing NES use and its implications in people’s daily lives and
experiences.
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